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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 05/03/2011

Accident number: 633

Accident time: 07:55

Accident Date: 09/06/2009

Where it occurred: AF12008/003241H453
3-8, Kandak-e-921
Sarhadi area, Kohsan
District, Herat Province
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Afghanistan

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 30/06/2009

ID original source: OPS/14/01-11: Ref:
09,06,199

Name of source: UMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 05/03/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 2

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
safety distances ignored (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a UNMACA
accident summary. The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
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being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised as more
information becomes available.
The summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA)
File: OPS/14/01-11: Ref: 09,06,199
Date: June 30, 2009
INVESTIGATION REPORT & LESSONS LEARNED OF [Demining group] DT-18 DEMINING
ACCIDENT IN KANDAK-E- 921 SARHADI AREA, KOSAN DISTRICT OF HERAT
PROVINCE
Attached please find the investigation report and Lessons Learned from the demining
accident, occurred to [Demining group] DT-18 on 09 June 2009 at 07.55 hours in Kosan
district of Herat Province.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT- 18 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by AMAC West to investigate the demining accident
involving [Victim No.1] and [Victim No.2] the Deminers from [Demining group] DT-18. The
accident occurred at 7:55 hours on 09 June 2009 at minefield number
AF12008/003241H4533-8, located in Kandak-e-921 Sarhadi area, Kohsan district of Herat
province.
SUMMARY:
AF/2008/00324/H4533-13 is an anti-personnel mine contaminated area laid by the
government forces during the Russian invasion in Afghanistan. The mines are laid in 2 rows
as a belt surrounding Kandak-e-921 Sarhadi in order to secure their positions from the attacks
of Mujahedeen. [Demining group] DT-18 was tasked for the clearance of mentioned area, on
9th of June 2009 at 07:55 am deminer [Victim No.1] was working in his clearance lane
excavating a detected signal, his prodder touched a mine and caused it to explode. According
to the investigation report the signal was not pinpointed correctly and the deminer has used
his prodder directly on the top of mine, so the accident happened. As a result of accident
[Victim No.1] got severe injures on his both eyes and face and lost his right eye completely,
because his visor was up during the operation. Another deminer named [Victim No.2] was
also injured in this accident, because of being in a close proximity to [Victim No.1]. [Victim
No.2] was carrying some painted rocks for marking purpose. He has also got injuries on his
face. The command group was failed to control and stop them.
CONCLUSIONS:
As it seems, the carelessness of victim deminer and poor supervision are the contributing
factors to this accident, but it is a management problem that a demining team is working on a
mine belt, without considering safety procedures at all i.e. not using PPEs, not considering
safety distance and lack of command and control. It means the performance of team has not
been evaluated by the operations department.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
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[Demining group] operations department is requested to present their management solution
for such accidents in the future and provide MACCA OPS department with written documents
by no later than 5th of July 09.

Victim Report
Victim number: 815

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Eye, severe Face
AMPUTATION/LOSS, Eye Right
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Victim Report
Victim number: 816

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Not recorded

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Face
COMMENT: Facial injuries. No Medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because Victim
No.1 was working with his visor raised and his error was not corrected. Victim No.2 was close
by (with no visor) and so breaching IMAS recommended working distances (10m in an AP
blast mine area). The secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy
because the investigators identified “poor supervision” as a main cause and it is the senior
management’s responsibility to ensure that appropriately trained, experienced and
responsible field managers are in place.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years
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in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The existence of a good summary implies
that the Afghan investigators carried out a professional investigation and generated a detailed
report that should be shared.
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